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Abstract
Digital identity is essential to access services such as: on-
line banking, income tax portals, and online higher education.
Digital identity is often outsourced to central digital identity
providers, introducing a critical dependency. Self-Sovereign
Identity gives citizens the ownership back of their own iden-
tity. However, proposed solutions concentrate on data disclo-
sure protocols and are unable to produce identity with legal sta-
tus. We identify how related work attempts to legalize identity
by reintroducing centralization and disregards common attacks
on peer-to-peer interactions, missing out on the strong privacy
guarantees offered by the data disclosure protocols. To address
this problem we present IPv8, a complete system for passport-
grade Self-Sovereign Identity. Our design consists of a hierar-
chy of middleware layers which are minimally required to es-
tablish legal viability. IPv8 is comprised of a peer-to-peer mid-
dleware stack with Sybil attack resilience and strong privacy
through onion routing. No other work has offered an opera-
tional prototype of an academically pure identity solution with-
out any trusted third parties, critical external services, or any
server in general.
1 Introduction
Who are you? is the central question in this time of identity
theft, phishing attacks, election meddling, fake reviews, behav-
ioral tracking, and bots spreading misinformation on social me-
dia. Our identity and daily life is going digital, including our
friendships, education, employment, healthcare, finance, and
entertainment. Solving the problem of digital identity is be-
coming a societal concern [68, 59]. The scope for digital iden-
tity is broad, as it should be usable for both filling in online
web forms and also for boarding international flights. In this
paper we introduce a novel distributed infrastructure for digital
identity which meets the stringent passport-grade requirement
of governments, provides strong privacy protection for citizens,
and does not rely on any third party.
Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is a new approach to online
identity. This approach promises to solve the current prob-
lems around online identity and provide the underpinning for
our digital society and economy [96]. The essential premise
of SSI is that it is in your complete control. No central entity
exists to manage your identity, give you permission to use it,
or which can revoke your entire online presence. The SSI ap-
proach empowers individuals and entities themselves to man-
age their identities in a decentralized fashion, without reliance
on any third-party identity provider.
A basic SSI contains cryptographically signed information
such as I am older than 21, I am licensed to drive a car, and
a more complex My pre-tax income lies between 40k and 50k,
which are called verifiable claims. In a future form we believe
that all your online passwords, car keys, credit cards and even
banknotes will be stored in some form of personal digital wallet.
For instance, various central banks are experimenting with Cen-
tral Bank Digital Currency [29]. These verifiable claims need
to be signed and given to you by trustworthy issuers, but do not
contain any personally identifiable information. This approach
using a wallet is known as claim-based identification [25, 4, 82].
SSI is designed to protect your privacy and only disclose the
minimally required information. Current scientific research in
this area is primarily focused on the data disclosure protocols
and ensuring minimal or even zero privacy leakage (e.g., Zero-
Knowledge Proofs [42]).
Our aim is to close the gap between state-of-the-art academic
proposals and deficient (non-)commercial offerings, and on the
other side real-world usage of SSI for each transaction within
our daily lives: from airplane boarding to online product re-
views. The special property that we offer is strong privacy,
without compromising on security. Our approach is compliant
with one of strongest consumer privacy protection laws: The
European Union GDPR [54].
Within this work we focus on strong privacy for SSI.
Deanonymization of users, the loss of strong privacy, is rarely
performed through frontal attacks on the cryptography of data
disclosure protocols. Device fingerprinting is one of the main
methods to compromise privacy of Internet users [99, 16]. We
are not the first to suggest using Tor to address this privacy con-
cern [91], but we are the first to create a viable prototype in
a truly Self-Sovereign manner (a truly zero-server approach).
We document our complete system, geared towards deployment
and standard setting.
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Our scientific contribution is two-fold:
1. We provide a complete and substantiated design for the
creation of Self-Sovereign Identity solutions with strong
privacy called IPv8.
2. We discuss the performance, drawbacks and possible
attacks on the identified core components of a passport-
grade Self-Sovereign Identity solution.
2 Problem statement
Verifiable claims (e.g. “I am older than 21”) form the heart
of Self-Sovereign Identity [25, 4, 82]. Existing work in this
area often reduces the problem as merely a data disclosure
problem, thereby ignoring many other problems and essential
components. A complete architectural view of Self-Sovereign
Identities is missing, which would identify open problems and
outline these many components. We believe passport-grade
digital identity is required for broad societal usage, necessar-
ily involving governments. To date, no work has identified or
addressed the gap between state-of-the-art academic research
and the functional and legal requirements of governments. Ex-
isting works which offer a complete digital identity solution
contain a large number of (fragile) components which com-
promise Self-Sovereignty or compromise privacy; they nul-
lify Zero-Knowledge Proofs [16]. The problem remains how
to provide an academically pure Self-Sovereign Identity so-
lution with strong privacy, full decentralisation, and only de-
pending on pure peer-to-peer communication. All existing
work depends on a central permissioned server (Hyperledger
Indy [46]), central non-profit organization (IRMA [6]), central
universal resolver (DID [83]), or smart contract payment han-
dler (uPort [65]).
The philosophical principles for Self-Sovereign Identity have
been already established [4]. The concept of Self-Sovereign
Identity dictates that no third party should be able to observe or
interfere with either establishment or verification of claims over
identity data. We formulate the first exact technical problem
specification as follows: Two peers communicate their requests
and responses (requiring integrity and authenticity) to perform
identity disclosure with accountability via a decentrally estab-
lished covert channel. The identity data disclosure should allow
for four types of messaging over two message flows (see Fig-
ure 1):
• Flow A: Claim creation (A.1) and attestation to a created
claim by an issuer (A.2).
• Flow B: Request for proof of a claim (B.1) and subsequent
proof of a claim (B.2).
Subject IssuerVerifier A.1. Claim
A.2. Attest
B.1. Verify
B.2. Prove
Figure 1: The two communication flows when establishing and
verifying a claim. Both flows go through the subject in a Self-
Sovereign Identity solution.
An analogous physical example of this digital interaction is a
citizen claiming to be older than 21 (A.1) and a government
providing a passport that proves this claim (A.2). The citizen in
this example could then later attempt to buy liquor in a liquor
store which would ask for proof that this citizen is over 21 (B.1)
for which the citizen shows his passport (B.2). We will discuss
the various implementations of claims such as this one in Sec-
tion 6.
3 IPv8 Design
We now present our system which fulfills our technical prob-
lem description: IPv8. IPv8 has been initiated in 2016 and
created in tight collaboration with both government and indus-
try. Our methodology consists of an iterative process of doc-
umenting, rapid prototyping, small-scale trials, and deep-dive
sessions. Legal experts have established that in legal terms
Self-Sovereign Identity is an unexplored field. Our design com-
plies as much as possible with existing standards for authenti-
cation. For instance, authentication levels for digital identities
have long since been standardized by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology [44].
An essential IPv8 design choice for security and privacy is
that the verifiable claims are stored in encrypted form. Un-
locking these encrypted claims requires passport-grade facial
recognition. This component in IPv8 is supplied by IDEMIA,
the paper-based passport supplier of Kingdom of the Nether-
lands. After various cycles of real-world testing and re-design
we identified 7 top-level requirements, and derived a middle-
ware architecture with 3 layers, see Figure 2.
3.1 Communication Substrate
The bottom-layer of IPv8 within Figure 2 provides commu-
nication services. This also introduces top-level requirements
(1),(2), and (3). Peers must be able to (1) communicate without
an intermediary. To disallow this communication from being
modified by a malicious peer, messages must be (2) authentic
and maintain (3) integrity.
2
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Figure 2: The stack of components that makes IPv8.
Messaging Interface. The messaging interface serves the
design pillar of decentralized communication. The messag-
ing interface standardizes communication between nodes in
the network and is responsible for blocking (but not detecting)
network-level attacks like spam attacks [63].
Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure. The DPKI layer
serves authenticity and integrity of messages between peers us-
ing digital signatures. This middleware layer also makes sure
blacklisted identities are not communicated with and forms the
basis for identity-to-identity communication.
3.2 Anonymization Overlay
Our second layer of Figure 2 facilitates decentral (4)
anonymization to both disallow malicious peers blocking com-
munication and malicious verifiers from tracking subjects (be-
coming the malicious intermediary in another message flow).
To establish anonymization, peers in the network will have to
be able to (5) synchronize information.
Overlay Framework. The network overlay middleware fa-
cilitates synchronization between peers and handles common
interactions for (structured and unstructured [81]) overlays. It
facilitates user-defined message flows and handles messages for
internal session management, like NAT puncturing. This layer
also detects attacks and node churn. Overlays building on this
middleware will simply be shown a list of peers (based on pub-
lic keys) they can send messages to.
Anonymization Overlay. The anonymization overlay is re-
quired for anonymization of communication, which we will re-
fer to as communication through covert channels. This layer
allows users to rendezvous and communicate covertly without
publicly announcing this on a DHT mechanism, which could be
blocked by attackers.
3.3 Identification Layer
Using the anonymization, peers should be able to (6) identify
themselves using a data disclosure scheme. However, peers do
need to be held (7) accountable for their actions to have their
identities hold legal value.
Persistent Storage Overlay. To facilitate a wide array of
commitment and revocation schemes used by the SSI layer,
applications need to be accountable. This accountability is
achieved through the storage of immutable information (ver-
ifiable integrity). The stored information may be available
network-wide, such as in blockchain, or behind access control
lists (only shared and verifiable for selected parties).
Self-Sovereign Identity Overlay. Finally, the SSI overlay
allows for identification. This layer handles the SSI-related
communication between pseudonyms. It defines the semantics,
storage and method of proving claims tied to pseudonyms. The
high-level functionality of this layer is exposed to the applica-
tion layer.
4 Communication Substrate
Any machine-to-machine communication constitutes a breach
of identity. Fundamentally, any signal that is sent out into the
world can be tracked to a source (be it a radio signal, an IP-
address, or otherwise). This is a law of nature and seems to pre-
vent any identity solution from being privacy preserving. How-
ever, being identifiable in a local neighborhood does allow for
covert communication establishment on a pseudonym basis. As
Self-Sovereign Identity dictates the absence of intermediaries, a
central server cannot mediate a covert communication channel
however. Therefore, IPv8 includes decentral networking prim-
itives that form the basis for establishing covert communica-
tion channels (which we discuss later in Section 5) defining a
communication protocol with open membership, interoperabil-
ity and trust.
Whereas the topic of peer-to-peer messaging and its cor-
responding network protocols is a dead topic to academia,
it remains the primary attack vector on Internet-scale decen-
tral systems like Bitcoin and remains littered with open prob-
lems [72, 50]. One may be tempted to patch up existing iden-
tity solutions using Tor [91]. Sadly, the straightforward appli-
cation of Tor is not sufficient for these types of systems [15].As
these networking primitives are often omitted not only from
the literature but also from the implementation, we present a
short overview of essential features of peer-to-peer communi-
cation in adversarial settings. Self-Sovereign Identity solutions
need to consciously consider their networking primitives or face
deanonymization on the application layer.
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4.1 Messaging and DPKI
Both Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure [1] and Message
Oriented Middleware [9] have been well-explored. As they
form the primary attack vectors on IPv8, we briefly discuss the
responsibilities and functionality of these layers.
Messaging interface. IPv8 allows for messaging over het-
erogeneous media, like the Internet, Bluetooth, NFC and any
other medium that allows for messages to be sent (even QR-
codes—though camera-to-camera communication is quite im-
practical). Due to the abstraction over all these types of con-
nection media, IPv8 provides a connectionless messaging API
to higher layers (hiding possible connection sessions). This al-
lows IPv8 to be used by both stateful network session managers
like TCP and stateless frame-based session managers like UDP.
The messaging interface abstracts over all these media, but ex-
plicitly exposes the available interface options to the overlay
middleware. This interface must allow the overlay layer to close
connections to detected Sybils, spammers or otherwise mali-
cious nodes [63].
Given an adapter for the message serialization format, we
note that the messaging interface does not hamper the interop-
erability sought after by Self-Sovereign Identity solutions. Ul-
timately, the control over what data gets sent over the commu-
nication channels lies with the overlay layer. Even though IPv8
defines a default format, users of are not bound to it. However,
a properly defined binary format like IPv8’s will use less space
than Google’s Protobuf or JSON implementations [78], the con-
sequences of which we will evaluate in Section 8 (with JSON
being the primary messaging format of IPv8’s competition).
Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure. The DPKI mid-
dleware of IPv8 is tasked with managing peers: public keys
with their respectively known connection interfaces and chan-
nel identifiers. This forms the fundamental design principle
of IPv8: identity to identity communication. The DPKI layer
manages supported cryptographic protocols and takes care of
creating signatures for all outgoing messages and verifying sig-
natures for all incoming messages.
One of the principles of Self-Sovereign Identity is the abil-
ity to choose whatever identity the user likes. This free-
dom is still bound by implementation though and—at the time
of writing—IPv8 only supports the following key formats:
SECT163K1, SECT233K1, SECT409K1, SECT571R1 and
EC25519 (with the latter being the default as it has been
proven to be secure [13]). The supported elliptic curves are
the first major hurdle for users of our SSI framework as two
users cannot communicate if they do not share the same cryp-
tographic algorithms. IPv8 encourages (but is not bound to)
elliptic curve cryptography, as it has smaller public key and sig-
nature sizes [10].
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Figure 3: Time for gossiped information to converge for dif-
ferent network and local neighborhood sizes, using the IPv8
neighborhood creation protocol.
4.2 Overlay Framework
Given our messaging and DPKI middleware, we now reach the
abstraction layer of a distributed event-based system and its
many facets and security concerns [70]. The overlay frame-
work drives the event-driven nature of all network overlays in
our architecture, providing the ability to hook in periodic tasks.
These tasks range from peer discovery and peer churn to in-
stigating push-based gossip. Though all messages that reach
the overlay framework are bound to an identity, these identi-
ties may still be malicious or otherwise byzantine. The overlay
framework makes the process of dealing with these unwanted
nodes opaque for any overlays built on top of it. This frame-
work ensures that peers available to the overlay will converge
to a set of non-byzantine peers.
Peer discovery. The gossip protocols in IPv8 overlays will
not work if the network graph is not robust, that is all hon-
est nodes being interconnected in one large component [33].
Therefore, the peer discovery mechanism of IPv8 converges to
a set of honest nodes through periodic random walks, which
repeatedly sample the known peers and bootstrap nodes to ex-
pand their neighborhood. We note that no decentral protocol
exists that guarantees a non-eclipsed/non-Sybil neighborhood
upon bootstrapping into the network, only algorithms that con-
verge over time [92]. We have chosen the method of testing
physical resources to avoid Sybils [97] (which we discuss in
Section 5).
Our peer discovery protocol will actively connect to 20 other
peers to form a neighborhood and allow for up to 30 total open
connections through the active peer discovery of other peers.
This brings the information dissemination time of gossiping
protocols down to seconds for networks of even millions of
users, we show the result of a simulation with the King latency
dataset [28] and our deployed protocol in Figure 3. This con-
vergence time will be the primary driver for performance of
distributed synchronization mechanisms.
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Hole punching. An interface that has been discovered
cannot necessarily be communicated with. Many interfaces
(e.g., Firewalls and NAT layers) will need to be punctured or
hole punched before two-way communication can be estab-
lished [38]. This is a complex procedure for peer-to-peer net-
works, especially for TCP with IPv4 addresses. IPv8 remem-
bers the introducing peers (the network state in Figure 2), which
can facilitate establishing connections to introduced peers. The
particular messages to send to perform hole-punching, upon de-
ciding to connect to an introduced peer, are defined by the actual
interfaces.
Churn. Offline nodes cannot forward data, which severely
impacts the performance of overlay logic [60].Next to having a
list of interfaces and corresponding addresses, peers also store
the time the last message was received. Periodically, a random
sample of peers is checked for liveness – 30 seconds by default,
after which a peer will be contacted twice (after 10 and 20 sec-
onds). After a full minute (based on Internet measurements of
timeouts of deployed NAT algorithms [49]) without any mes-
sages a peer is dropped.
Synchronization. Given a set of (1) live, (2) connected and
(3) non-Sybil peers, a peer can synchronize information with
the network through gossip or flooding. Being able to syn-
chronize views with other honest peers allows a peer to make
use of both audit and revocation mechanisms, important for
Self-Sovereign Identities. The manner in which information is
disseminated and to what level the network is synchronized is
specified per message and per overlay.
5 Anonymization Overlay
All identity overlay messages in IPv8 are sent and received
covertly through the anonymization overlay. Especially for mo-
bile usecases, device fingerprinting can instantly deanonymize
even the cryptographically most secure protocol. Furthermore,
an attacker that is able to determine a channel between two
peers can perform a DOS attack to prevent communication from
happening. To solve these issues we have introduced covert
channels through the Tor onioning protocol with hidden ser-
vices [32, 73]. This allows all peers to decentrally establish a
hidden channel through several other peers for anonymization,
without being susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks using
Tor exit nodes [15]. To achieve this covert channel construction
being both (1) decentralized and (2) attacker-resilient utilizes
two novel protocols unique to IPv8.
Fingerprinting. The ability to fingerprint communication
channels or hardware [99] completely negates the security guar-
antees of identity disclosure protocols [91]. This is often over-
looked in the marketing and creation of identity solutions.
Static or semi-static identifiers such as MAC addresses or IP
addresses make it readily apparent that any two disclosed un-
linkable attributes or unlinkable pseudonyms belong together
(even MAC randomization often will not help [67, 94]). For
example, Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures allow for deriva-
tion of a new and unlinkable signature over the same data [24].
However, presenting two signatures from the same device with
the same MAC address and the same IP address (both leaked
over Wi-Fi) makes these signatures completely linkable. This
has even also practically been shown to be a primary attack vec-
tor for the poster-child anonymized cryptocurrency ZCash [16].
DOS attacks. An attacker may not always wish to
deanonymize a user, sometimes blocking the identification it-
self may be sufficient. For example, if a representative of a com-
peting company fails to get a loan in time to execute a particular
contract, the contract may expire and go to its competitor. This
type of attack will be harder to protect against in the age of
smart contracts and automated digital markets as—by design—
no human can reason about external factors. Originally ex-
plored through mixnets [26], by introducing covert channels,
attackers cannot practically discern the communication channel
of their target. The only way for an attacker to block commu-
nication is to indiscriminately attack all communication in the
entire network. Whereas one-off attacks (such as defection at-
tacks or DOS attacking of a particular peer) are hard to detect in
a network, forcing the attackers to perform multiple indiscrim-
inate attacks helps in the detection of attackers [80].
Decentralized Hidden Services. The Tor protocol was orig-
inally created to allow covert channels to be established [32].
Through the process of onioning over multiple network par-
ticipants, information is practically anonymized as the origi-
nal source of the information cannot practically be found. This
onioning consists of several layers of encryption of the same
data, both hiding the preceding and following path the informa-
tion will travel through—only being fully decrypted at the end
of the path. An extension to the Tor protocol allows two peers to
interact with end-to-end encryption over two of these onioned
communication paths linked together, called hidden services.
IPv8 uses a novel decentralized version of Tor’s hidden services
protocol, not requiring centralized directory servers [73].
Attack resilience. As IPv8 is fully decentralized, attackers
can introduce Sybils into the network to attack our path selec-
tion protocol (this protocol is also called telescoping). To avoid
Sybils, IPv8 finds a sufficiently diverse set of peers through tests
of physical resources [97]. This type of practical Sybil avoid-
ance was first explored in the context of DHT security [92].
Concretely, our novel protocol test latency in a manner for
which fake latencies are detected over time [89]. The idea is
that, over time, a non-Sybil peer will be available and selected
to establish a covert channel, allowing communication to the
outside world. A Sybil attack will never cause a permanent or
unrecoverable partitioning of honest nodes in the network when
coupled to a random walk strategy for peer discovery [22], as
deployed in IPv8.
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Figure 4: The time until an honest node is found by IPv8 as the
fraction of Sybil identities increases.
To show the practical attack resilience of our protocol, we
sample 100 real peers from our Tribler network. We also cre-
ate 100 Sybils, where each Sybil only introduces other Sybils
and actively attacks our protocol by artificially modifying its
latency. We sample from both groups to create different frac-
tions of attackers, for a total of 100 peers. We then measure
the amount of time it takes for an honest node to be found and
a covert channel to be established. We have graphed the re-
sults of our deployed protocol in Figure 4. Even in a 99% Sybil
network, honest nodes connect (and retain) other honest nodes
after 340 seconds. If we extrapolate these results to our network
of 50 000 nodes, this means attackers will need to be responsive
with almost 5 million Sybil identities to delay bootstrapping
nodes by almost 6 minutes. We have estimated the cost of this
attack on our current network to be roughly 4 million USD in
our previous work [89].
6 Self-Sovereign Identity Overlay
After establishing a covert channel to another peer in the net-
work possibly in adversarial conditions, finally a data disclo-
sure protocol can be used. We first discuss the fundamental
workings of Self-Sovereign pseudonyms, their management,
and their interactions using IPv8. In Section 7 we elaborate on
this Self-Sovereign Identity disclosure scheme and show how
to elevate the resulting pseudonyms to a passport grade Self-
Sovereign Identity.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Zero-Knowledge Proofs form the
core of the information disclosure mechanism in IPv8. A Zero-
Knowledge Proof is a construction that allows one party to learn
of only a property of some information known to the other party,
without revealing the actual information [42]. A practical ex-
ample is only revealing a subject is over 21 but not the exact age
of the subject. This differs from signatures as Zero-Knowledge
Proofs provide a decoupling of authenticity and knowledge of
information (only providing the latter, whereas a digital signa-
ture provides both). We build upon this decoupling and it will
be important for establishing pseudonyms of legal status.
In IPv8, the Zero-Knowledge Proof library contains three
algorithms: non-interactive Peng-Bao range proofs [75],
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures [24] and our own variant
of identity-based Proof of Plaintext [43] construction in the
encrypted domain using Boneh’s cryptosystem [18]. Which
algorithm is used, is driven by the semantic layer using the
Zero-Knowledge Proof library and parameterization of the al-
gorithms is stored inside metadata supplied with each commit-
ment. IPv8 abstracts over these Zero-Knowledge Proofs by
modularizing them and adding an interface for the application
layer to create and prove any implemented proof. The nomen-
clature for a commitment that represents information (held by
and of an individual) that can be shown to have certain proper-
ties is an attribute, when supplied with metadata it becomes a
credential [5] over which claims are made (A.1 in Figure 1).
The storage of each attribute concerns three types of data (of
which IPv8 implements two): the data supporting an attribute,
the private data to support the proving of the attribute, and the
public data bound to the pseudonym. Of these three types of
data, the data behind the attribute is not stored by IPv8 and can
be stored on secure hardware or reconstructed from the mem-
ory of the user (e.g., a password). In whatever manner this in-
formation is retrieved at runtime, which is application and use
case specific, it is supplemented with the private data stored by
IPv8 to form answers to the challenges posed by the other party
involved in the Zero-Knowledge Proof (the verifier). To create
these challenges, the verifier does need to know the semantics
(specifying the ZKP algorithm) and the public data needed for
the proof (e.g., the cryptographic commitment). A subject can
whitelist a verifying party to receive the metadata for a certain
attribute through applications built on IPv8.
Web of trust. The credibility of an attribute lies not with
the data it holds, but with those who attest to its truth. What
distinguishes a passport from a list of identity information is
the signature of your government. This same concept holds for
digital identities as well. For example, the fact that a subject
has an age and can show it is over 21 has no legal value unless
the government has digitally signed for the fact that the data in
the commitment this was shown for is correct. IPv8 exposes the
public keys that signed for certain attributes, but leaves the trust
model to the application layer.
In IPv8 the signatures of third parties are collected (just like
the PGP web of trust [100]) to attest to the credibility or truth
of attributes (A.2 in Figure 1). These signatures are made in-
dependently by third parties over the metadata of the attribute,
whereby this attestation is locked to a specific commitment and
ZKP protocol to avoid misuse of the signature. However, this
web of trust forms a social network: a side-channel that allows
for fingerprinting [88]. The selective disclosure of metadata and
attestations is left to the discretion of the user and over-use will
allow for this attack. Paradoxically, a single centralized attest-
ing authority actually avoids this as no social network can be
derived.
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Figure 5: Information structure of pseudonyms: a chain
of hashes from attesting signatures towards an originating
pseudonym public key.
Attribute-based pseudonyms. By combining Zero-
Knowledge Proofs, metadata, and third-party signatures (attes-
tations), a pseudonym of legal status can be created. As IPv8
is Self-Sovereign, a pseudonym can simply be created by gen-
erating a key pair with any of the elliptic curves supported by
IPv8—without identity vetting.
A user can add attributes to its pseudonym by attaching at-
tributes using the hash of the preceding attribute (or the public
key of the pseudonym), like the hash chains of blockchains.
Metadata will have to support each attribute, for which we
once again use a hash to point to the respective attribute. Fi-
nally, the collected third party signatures point to the meta-
data through a digital signature (which internally also uses a
hash), which in turn binds the metadata to the public key of the
signing third party—a pseudonym in itself (forming a web of
trust between pseudonyms). We now have pseudonyms with
attributes and we can fall back to the NIST recommendations
on Attribute-Based Access Control for the business logic sur-
rounding these pseudonyms [51]. The resulting structure of a
single pseudonym is shown in Figure 5.
Each pseudonym should contain as few attributes as possi-
ble. The more information is revealed through a pseudonym,
the stronger the correlation with a particular individual or other
pseudonyms will be. By creating an immutable linked list of
attributes, we allow for attributes to depend on each other. This
immutability makes sure attributes are not mixed-and-matched
from other pseudonyms, creating session guarantees. For in-
stance, a driver’s license may critically depend on a particu-
lar name, but the name may not always have to be disclosed.
To obfuscate the commitments belonging to the undisclosed at-
tributes, each attribute only contains the hash of the public data
and the hash of the preceding attribute. The actual commitment
will only be shared when executing the Zero-Knowledge Proof
over the attribute.
Each attribute is tied to the public key of the pseudonym.
However, ownership of this public key has to be shown—at
least once—to tie the session in the covert channel to the pre-
sented pseudonym. This can be done by providing a digital
signature over a nonce (supplied by a verifying party) with the
private key belonging to the pseudonym, but should only be
done once and when any verification is performed, as usage of
this key weakens its security [62].
Authentication through attributes. A session with a
pseudonym may be authentic and covert, but device theft may
have occurred: the holder of the device might not correspond to
the enrolled identity. What drives the value and interoperabil-
ity of Self-Sovereign Identities, is the portability of its available
authentication mechanisms [96].Not only should you be able to
verify a certain property of data signed for by a third party, you
should be able to verify the same authentication was used at
the time of verification. This allows an application to bind the
physical user to its device. For this verification of third party au-
thentication, we can also use the attributes of a pseudonym [57].
The contents of authenticating attributes can vary from One
Time Passwords (e.g. with YubiKey [52]) to static passwords
and even biometric checks (we have even implemented Phys-
ically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) on off-the-shelf SRAM
chips [86]). It is important that these types of checks include
liveness detection. Though attacks on hardware (tokens) and
biometry are prevalent (iris scans and facial detection can be
fooled [84, 66]), the more authentication attributes are added to
a pseudonym, the better its security guarantees will be (going
even far beyond the standards of the NIST on demand [44]).
The first prototype of IPv8 included only (closed-source) facial
recognition by IDEMIA. The holder of the device was chal-
lenged to move his or her face in a certain direction, one of the
available mechanisms to avoid spoofing [40].
Verification of attributes. At some point in its business
logic a verifying party will require a proof of some attribute
of a pseudonym: a request for information disclosure (B.1
in Figure 1). We assume this initial interaction happens out-
side of IPv8, but provides a link between the two respective
identities (for example by scanning a QR code of the key of
each user or communicated within an HTTPS session—both
of which we have implemented for IPv8). The verification
logic in IPv8 is then intiated by the verifying party requesting
proof of a certain type of (standardized) metadata. A simplified
typical request would be ("age", "ZKRP Peng-Bao",
"version 3")—specifying the semantics, the ZKP algo-
rithm and the parameterization of the required attribute. Such a
request for verification is mapped onto the available attributes
of a pseudonym based on the metadata. IPv8 will present the
application layer with the most recent attribute that fulfills the
verification requirements.
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Through the REST API of IPv8 the outstanding verification
requests are communicated to the holder of a pseudonym and
have to be manually allowed (this is the principle of control in
Self-Sovereign Identities). When allowed, IPv8 will automati-
cally share (1) the metadata of the particular attribute, (2) the at-
tribute and all preceding attributes in the hash chain and (3) the
attestations belonging to this metadata (B.2 in Figure 1). After
confirming the structural integrity of the hash chain, the veri-
fier’s IPv8 instance will generate a series of challenges for the
presented ZKP. The subject’s IPv8 instance will answer these
requests automatically and the verifier’s IPv8 instance then cal-
culates the output of the ZKP. The verifier will then check it’s
REST API to see the outcome of the ZKP protocol, which usu-
ally completes within a few seconds, and reason about the pre-
sented probability (the default settings of IPv8 go up to roughly
99.8% probability, completing in 100ms on a modern smart-
phone).
7 Persistent Storage Overlay
A Self-Sovereign Identity of passport grade requires more than
just revealing information. To be on the level of passports, audit
logs must exist for governments to hold individuals accountable
for their use and misuse of their identities [3, 76]. Punishable
but correct identity use would be an individual breaking the
law after gaining access to some resource (e.g. a certified bank
employee logging into his bank system and stealing all of the
money). Punishable and incorrect use would be attempting to
identify with the claims of others, i.e. identity theft—which is a
federal offense in many parts of the world [93]. To enforce pun-
ishment, parties attesting to the truth of attributes may want to
revoke their attestation of a particular attribute. The validity of
a passport may, for example, need to be instantly retracted once
the individual commits a terrorist act. Both of these punishable
acts require persistent storage, albeit in different fashions.
Audit logs. Use of any pseudonym has to be auditable
to hold individuals accountable and to be trustworthy. The
trust in pseudonyms in IPv8 is anchored in attributes and the
pseudonyms that attest to them through a web of trust. At the
same time, Self-Sovereign Identity is inherently permissionless.
To hold individuals accountable a longer-term log of interac-
tion will have to be maintained. By storing the commitments,
metadata and attestations presented to a verifier, the state of a
pseudonym at the time of using it to engage in a business trans-
action can be captured—as we have explored in our previous
work [90]. However, as attributes are essentially conflict-free
data types [87], no network-wide consensus is required (or de-
sirable for that matter). For example, a liquor store should be
able to prove to an auditor (through the construction we ex-
plained in Section 6) that a pseudonym it has interacted with
had valid facial recognition and was older than 21.
Though the audit logs are immutable through signatures (to
avoid tampering and to hold legal status), they should not be
legitimacy
correctnesscredibility
Figure 6: The self-reinforcing loop of credibility through digital
signatures.
shared publicly. Only certified auditors may piece together
which individual belongs to the particular pseudonym. We
achieve this by requiring all businesses to check for an attribute
that is attested by a certified auditor (e.g. a facial recognition
attribute made by a government). Through the auditor main-
taining (with a Proof of Plaintext Knowledge) a secret link be-
tween the attribute of the pseudonym and the central register
of all citizens, pseudonyms can be held accountable. Note that
both the user and the verifier of the Self-Sovereign Identity may
choose not to allow auditing, but will probably be forced —by
law— to do so. This is a regulatory gray area as more stringent
regulation only follows after widespread use—as has happened
for cryptocurrencies [77]—which we attempt to enable preemp-
tively.
Practically, the auditability of pseudonyms functions much
like collaterals in cryptocurrencies [7]. Any legal pseudonym
holds a cryptographic commitment signed by an auditing au-
thority as a collateral for passport-grade interaction. This com-
mitment does not have to be used for all use cases, only for
passport-grade interactions. We note that new pseudonyms can
be enrolled on-demand by the user at passport level using a
combination of unlinkable signature derivation (e.g. using CL
signatures [24] or BLS signatures [19]), commitment blinding
(for example Pedersen commitments [74]) and a commitment
equality scheme (for example Boudot’s commitment equality
check [23]). The regulatory requirements for decrypting such a
commitment have not been standardized or drafted at this point
in time.
Revocation. The philosophy of Self-Sovereign Identities is
that users control their own data and are free to remove it or hide
it from others [4]. This allows the citizen the control over the
use of the identity information of the respective citizen. How-
ever, the credibility or value of presented information lies not
with the information itself—but with the authority that signs
for it. A practical example is that the signature of a government
holds more power over the truth in the eyes of a third party of
residence permits than the signature of your next-door neighbor.
With the practical imbalance in authority, digital signatures
become the primary method of credibility in a decentralized
identity system. In turn, with deriving credibility comes the risk
of influencing the legitimacy of authorities [45], forming the
feedback loop of Figure 6. Signatures over false data or false
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claims result in reputation damage (and therefore the credibility
to be derived from signatures of this entity). As passports and
the certification of passports are a paid service, managing this
risk also has monetary value. For any authorities signing for
data of citizens (users of the identity solution) making sure that
their signatures only apply to correct data or claims is therefore
of the utmost importance to their credibility and therefore busi-
ness model or public services. Being able to rectify or revoke
signatures by authorities that have been granted to citizens is
therefore the cornerstone of crediblity and legality.
Several solutions have been deployed to enable revocation
by authorities [48]. The first and fastest solution adds a link to
the revocation register (central server) of the signing authority,
e.g., a revocation authority in IRMA [64]. However, the sign-
ing authority will have to be online and can track the use of the
attribute (see our earlier notes on fingerprinting)—which is not
self-sovereign. The second solution is the complete decentral-
ization of revocations using a shared log, e.g., a blockchain—as
used by Sovrin [53], and (anonymized) membership tests for
signatures/attestations. Writing to a shared log takes more time
for the revocation to reach finality, could invalidate the incen-
tives the log was built around and has the issue of unbounded
growth of the log. The third solution is to include validity
terms into the metadata of attributes, e.g. epochs of lifetime
in Idemix [14]. By applying shorter validity terms to attributes,
the risk of the snapshot of the attribute being out of date is miti-
gated. The downside of validity terms is that they are snapshots
and are not instantly revoked. None of the available revocation
methods fits all use cases, but IPv8 enables all three.
8 Evaluation
The primary carriers for Self-Sovereign Identities are mobile
devices, as they are portable and can be easily supplied with
identity information (e.g. biometry through their camera or by
plugging in hardware tokens into the USB port). Next to the
time it takes to actually establish claims and prove them, which
form the main flows of Figure 1, we also measure the CPU and
network traffic (in Section 8.2 and Section 8.3 respectively).
These are relevant performance metrics, as mobile devices of-
ten have scarce resources (or at least limited battery life). Both
CPU and networking capabilities of mobile devices are limited
and costly. Hereby we show which of the components of our
system warrant performance optimizations. For example, the
chosen parameterization of the anonymization layer greatly im-
pacts the latency of both attribute enrollment and verification.
Bartolomeu [11] presents several options for systems to
benchmark against: Hyperledger Indy, uPort, Veres One and
Jolocom. If we eliminate all solutions that either use a permis-
sioned blockchain or require payment to use (two clear indi-
cators that a solution is not truly Self-Sovereign), we end up
with no solutions. Even though we object to naming these solu-
tions Self-Sovereign, for the sake of benchmarking, we will still
compare our “transaction” delay (attribute enrollment) to these
solutions in Section 8.1 (except for Veres One, which was al-
ready identified as non-competitive by Bartolomeu [11]). Fur-
thermore, given the nature of our use case, we do not believe
throughput is an appropriate metric for passport-level interac-
tions. One does not perform multiple requests for mortgages
per second.
For a fair comparison, we only measure the cre-
ation/enrollment and verification of attributes/credentials of
each solution. This highlights the performance difference, or
lack thereof, between the often-discussed data disclosure imple-
mentations. For IPv8 this means the removal of the anonymiza-
tion layer, discussed separately in Section 8.4.
We have benchmarked our Python implementation of IPv8.
All experiments are performed on a virtual machine running
Ubuntu 19.10, with 4 CPU cores fixed to 3.50 GHz and 16 384
MB of memory. All attribute enrollment and verification struc-
tures in IPv8 are measured as-is with default settings, no modi-
fications have been made to the publicly available source code.
We note that we measure IPv8’s compatibility layer for the
IRMA protocol [6] (which in turn is an implementation of
Idemix [14]) and should not be assumed to necessarily be equal
to the performance statistics without our protocol integration.
To IPv8’s disadvantage, we will assume that the blockchain so-
lutions also reach instant finality as soon as a transaction for a
block is created and that no attackers exist in the network (op-
timistically, blockchains can handle up to roughly 50% attack-
ers [69]—though practically probably less [35]).
8.1 Latency
Mobile devices and hardware tokens have been used for identi-
fication for decades, but have never seen wide adoption due to
(among other factors) high latency [20]. Clearly, critically de-
pending on a Proof-of-Work blockchain in an identity solution
is unacceptable, as it pushes the latency of credential creation to
an hour (to reach the commonly imposed 6-block rule for prob-
abilistic finality [95]). This is too slow for most passport-grade
interactions, e.g., electronic border control should be done in 30
seconds [58]. As a side note, using a permissioned blockchain
to create identities with a lower latency creates a chicken-and-
egg problem: you require a centrally known identity to create
your identity (also having to answer to a central party before
entering the system is naturally not Self-Sovereign). From a
latency perspective, no blockchain is (at the time of writing) a
good fit for Self-Sovereign Identities.
Eliminating blockchains from the equation, we end up with
just the credential (creation and verification) middleware. With
Hyperledger Indy, uPort and Jolocom all follow the W3C DID
standard and allow for schemas and public keys to be cus-
tomized. For all implementations we create a credential schema
with a single attribute. IPv8 goes beyond this and also al-
lows for different proving structures, which we measure and
visualize separately. We measured IPv8’s interactive Zero-
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Figure 7: Latency of credential creation and verification using different identity semantics and solutions.
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Figure 8: CPU usage of credential creation and verification using different identity semantics and solutions.
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Figure 9: Network usage of credential creation and verification using different identity semantics and solutions.
Knowledge Proofs for the 1024-bit and 4096-bit input spaces
(we leave out the 9216-bit proof). We measured IPv8’s Non-
Interactive Zero-Knowledge Range Proof, which we refer to as
the Peng-Bao proof (after its creators [75]). Lasty, we mea-
sured IPv8’s blinded signature scheme based on Idemix [14]:
IRMA [6]. The boxplots of all of these credential implementa-
tions are given in Figure 7, for both enrollment and verification
of credentials. The disclosure schemes implemented in IPv8 are
presented to the left of the dotted line, those on the right side of
the dotted line are the solutions we benchmark against.
From our latency comparison, we find no clear winner from
all of the evaluated credential implementations. What is gained
in enrollment latency is lost in verification latency and vice-
versa, with Hyperledger Indy being the most consistent between
these two categories (but also not the fastest). All of the eval-
uated solutions are well within the 30 second usability range.
It would be dishonest to claim that the 1024 bit space Zero-
Knowledge Proof of IPv8 is the best solution, as it can only
handle up to 128 bytes of information securely (for reference:
this can code most addresses in world) while the other creden-
tial solutions can handle arbitary-size inputs. What this does
show is that choosing the correct credential disclosure protocol
is important to satisfy the need for either low enrollment or low
verification latencies. A freedom of choice only IPv8 offers.
8.2 CPU
We have known for decades that (next to displays and disks)
CPU processing induces a significant power drain on comput-
ing devices [98]. However, the actual power use of a device is
hard to predict or generalize due to the heterogeneity of hard-
ware, Operating Systems and their process scheduling algo-
rithms. As we have run our experiments on a homogeneous
virtualized setup, we provide a ballpark estimate for the “power
rankings” of the different Self-Sovereign Identity solutions. As
in the previous latency experiment, we measure each credential
creation and verification implementation separately. The results
are visualized in Figure 8. Only uPort offers a suprise, in that it
has a much higher CPU usage for both enrollment and verifica-
tion of credentials. From our experiments, we infer that CPU is
not a significant distinguishing factor for current Self-Sovereign
Identities.
8.3 Network Traffic
Next to processing power, the power drain due to wireless traffic
is also a major factor in battery drain of mobile devices [31].
To this end, we also evaluate the network traffic as a result of
the various credential implementations. We use the same setup
as in the latency and CPU measurement sections. We further
explicitly note that our reasoning for looking at the network
traffic is based on the power consumption and not the latency
(which we have already shown in a previous experiment). Since
the deployment of 3G mobile communication networks, mobile
phones are able to transfer megabytes per second [36]. We will
momentarily show that the transfer rate of several megabytes is
already overprovisioned for the needs of identity solutions.
We once again benchmark our credential structures against
Hyperledger Indy, uPort and Jolocom and visualize the total
network traffic in Figure 9. The most obvious result is that inter-
active Zero-Knowledge Proofs require much more traffic than
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs and signature schemes
to verify. The worst case, IPv8’s 4096 bit proof, requires up to
70 kilobytes of data to be transferred (though this is still com-
pletely acceptable for devices capable of communicating at sev-
eral megabytes per second). The low traffic for Non-Interactive
Zero-Knowledge Proofs is expected, as it is the design goal of
such proofs [17]. Lastly, the signature scheme variants also
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Figure 10: Circuit creation time in IPv8.
show limited network use. However, as all of the solutions we
have benchmarked IPv8 against communicate through (mostly)
human-readable JSON, we see the network traffic greatly in-
flated. This seems to be a consequence of the modern software
engineering practices of containerized microservices [41] and
Javascript-based implementations [55]. The network traffic of
these solutions could have been reduced by utilizing a binary
format [78].
8.4 Anonymization
Thus far we have shown the feasibility of using different
credential implementations with vastly different cryptographic
primitives. We now discuss the performance implications of
the anonymization middleware in IPv8. We measure the perfor-
mance of our anonymization through real users of Tribler [79].
We give the creation time for circuits (covert channels) of the
three lengths default to Tribler: 1 hop, 2 hops and 3 hops. This
hop count corresponds to the amount of intermediaries that de-
crypt and forward data in a circuit. The more hops a circuit con-
tains, the harder it will be for an adversary to decrypt or block
any particular channel. By default, Tribler opens and maintains
4 through 8 of these circuits per resource session.
We have visualized the time it takes to create a circuit for
differing hop counts in Figure 10. We show the parameteriza-
tion of the anonymization middleware is very important for the
latency of the overall identity solution. Using 1 hop anonymiza-
tion, the anonymization latency is hardly significant in respect
to the latency of the credential implementations (Figure 7). Us-
ing 2 hops of anonymization, the anonymization latency is com-
parable to the credential implementations. Finally, at 3 hops of
anonymization, the anonymization latency is dominant in re-
spect to the credential implementations. This brings us to the
discussion of what hop count to use wich is, after 16 years of
Tor deployment, still an open problem [12].
9 Related Work
A promising start has been made in the field to try and make
sense of all the available information disclosure technology, its
mapping to the W3C DID standard [83], and its interaction with
blockchains [71, 54] and distributed storage like IPFS [37].
A critical view of the system components of Self-Sovereign
Identity, however, is missing in academia and is only briefly
discussed in industry whitepapers, the most notable analysis
coming from SelfKey [39]. Many SSI solutions claim they
are anonymous, but this is erroneous as they only achieve
pseudonymity and do not address device fingerprinting [91].
We postulate that anonymity and identity disclosure protocols
are orthogonal, but can be combined to achieve pseudonimity
with selective disclosure of information.
Early work using central servers. Early work focuses
on supplying users with the ability to tie their claims to a
token-based identity, as examplified by Microsoft Passport [25],
OAuth [27], FIDO [61] and OpenID [82]. At the time, the use-
case of identification of users was to reidentify with the same
central server—but these works did the ground work for cryp-
tography, the terminology (e.g., “claims” and “relying parties”),
and the principles of Self-Sovereign Identity.
Unlinkable signature-based disclosure schemes. Many of
the mainstream Self-Sovereign Identity solutions are based on
signature derivation (most notably Idemix’s CL signatures [24]
and JSON Web Tokens [34]), possibly storing revocations on
blockchains [2]. These signatures bind the key of the iden-
tity holder to the disclosed data and usually allow derivation
of a new signature that is also valid for the same data (which
is claimed to make this data unlinkable, though fingerprinting
makes users completely linkable as we have previously dis-
cussed). Examples of these types of systems are IRMA [6],
Jolocom and uPort [47], ClaimChain [56], and HyperLedger
Indy and its flagship implementation of Sovrin [85].
ZKP-based identities. Identification through Zero-
Knowledge protocols has been proposed decades ago [30] and
is once again hailed as the primary driver for cryptographic
Self-Sovereign Identities [8]. However, Zero-Knowledge
Proofs over data remain scarcely documented and rarely im-
plemented by academia [21], though this type of system is
widely proposed by industry, with https://github.com/
peacekeeper/blockchain-identity listing 134 Self-
Sovereign Identity solutions based on blockchain, mostly using
smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain.
10 Conclusion
Research on Self-Sovereign Identities is obsessed with crypto-
graphic information disclosure protocols. However, our anal-
ysis shows that these protocols are not a differentiating factor
between Self-Sovereign Identity solutions. Instead, the perfor-
mance and security concerns appear at the—often undiscussed
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and perhaps ignored and neglected—edges of the system and
its middleware layers. As a prominent example, device fin-
gerprinting attacks allow for almost trivial deanonymization of
even the most advanced cryptographic information disclosure
schemes. We have shown the feasibility of a passport grade
Self-Sovereign Identity through our design and implementation
of IPv8. Though implementations of the information disclo-
sure protocols of IPv8, HyperLedger Indy, uPort and Jolocom
have equivalent latencies, the establishment of covert channels
is shown to quickly become dominant for common security
settings, leading to latencies in the order of several seconds.
Our Self-Sovereign Identity solution of IPv8 cannot be finger-
printed, allows for passport-grade interactions, and has accept-
able interaction latency.
Availability
All code of IPv8 is available on GitHub at https://
github.com/Tribler/py-ipv8 and is provided under
the GNU LGPL 3.0 license.
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